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RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM: SOME PROBLEMS OF THE FAITH HEALER
I have no power to heal. All that I can do is to remind them of the
bigness of God, the greatness of God, that he is still God Almighty. I
am only the vessel that is surrendered. God does the rest.
-Kathryn Kuhlman'
I. INTRODUCTION
Reliance on prayer and faith as part of the healing process is un-
doubtedly as old as human history. In "primitive" cultures, which have
little in the way of economic specialization, the only specialist may be
the shaman, a combination priest-healer whose duty is to communi-
cate with supernatural forces, incomprehensible to most.2 There is lit-
tle differentiation between "faith" and "healing." Survival of society
depends on the good health of every working member, and a society
which has little in the way of effective medicine could be expected to
rely heavily on help from supernatural powers-but rarely are faith and
medicine thought to be mutually exclusive.8
1. GOD CANDO ITAGAIN9 (1969).
2. See, e.g., C. Lvi-STRAuss, The Sorcerer and His Magic, in STRUCTURAL ANTHRO-
POLOGY 161 (Anchor Books ed. 1967) (discussing the education of the shaman and the
psychology of shamanism in several primitive cultures); Risse, Shamanism: The Dawn
of a Healing Profession, 71 Wis. MED. J., Dec., 1972, at 18 (discussing the role of
the shaman as physician). Shamanism as a healing art addresses itself to the full range
of disease manifestation. Although western cultures tend to dichotomize disease manifes-
tations into "psychic" and "somatic" in origin, shamanism does not tend to recognize
such a distinction either in origin or in cure. "Faith healing" may be based on a similar
theoretical approach.
The shaman plays an important role in interpreting the meanings of religious beliefs
and customs regulating social organization and order within the community. Balikci,
Shamanistic Behavior Among the Netsilik Eskimos, in MAoIC, WrCHCRAFr AND CURING
191 (J. Middleton ed. 1967). The shaman in his role as advisor-interpreter of the social
order is also, in effect, a primitive legal specialist.
3. W. HowELLs, THE HEATHENS: PiumIrriV MAN AND HIS RELIGIONS 97-98 (Natural
History Lib. ed. 1962) discusses this concept among "primitive" peoples, M. CLARK,
HEALTH IN THE MEXICAN-AMERrCAN CutLTRE 115-16 (1970) describes the role of Cath-
olic and Protestant beliefs with regard to healing in a Mexican-American community.
Prayer is held to be a valuable, but not an exclusive remedy. She describes the minister
of one Pentecostal church in the area as being "against doctors," but states that the ma-
jority of believers in the Pentecostal sects seem not to discourage the use of medical fa-
cilities on the theory that the doctor is also an agent of God. ld. at 116. Provonsha,
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There are numerous religious sects, however, in the United States
and elsewhere, which preach faith healing and which at -times reject
the use of modern medicine.4 Many of the American cults which exist
today sprang up over one hundred years ago, when medical science
was considerably less reliable and when there may have been many
plausible reasons to distrust the discipline.5 Today, most Americans
would probably view religion and medicine as two distinct concepts,
having little in common. To some, however, "faith" and "healing" are
not so easily separable, and this may become a source of difficulty, since
"faith" is protected by the Constitution, but "healing" may be subject
to regulation.
For the purposes of this Comment, "faith healing" is defined
as the belief that disease may be cured by faith, prayer, and the divine
power of God alone, without the use of drugs or devices of any kind,6
and includes the beliefs of those who do not believe in "disease"
or "cure" in the usual medical sense.7  Although these beliefs are con-
ceptually distinguishable from the practice of medicine, -they present
Faith Healing, and the Faith Healers, 1962 MFz. ARTS & Sc. 38, elaborates on the per-
ceived conflict between faith and healing going back to the early days of Christianity.
4. Two recent studies describing the Pentecostal sects which preach faith healing are
Pattison, Lapins & Doerr, Faith Healing, NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE, Dec., 1973, at
397 [hereinafter cited as Pattison] and M. Siegel, Inferences Regarding Beliefs About
Health and Illness as Deduced from the Observation of a Charismatic Prayer Group,
1970 (unpublished thesis in U.C.L.A. Biomedical Library) [hereinafter cited as Siegel].
The Siegel study deals with a religious prayer group in the Southern California metropol-
itan area; the group's members are described as being of diverse backgrounds, and the
composition of the meetings may vary from week to week. They did not form a close-
knit social community. Id. at 30-31.
By contrast, the subjects of the Pattison study were all members of Seattle area
churches. They were similar in educational and occupational background and formed
definite social groups in which the social life was generally church-centered. Pattison,
supra at 398.
The Siegel group was extremely unlikely to find conflict between faith healing and
modern medicine. They generally saw divine intervention as a complement to medical
science and stressed co-operation between the two systems. Although they believed that
God can do what doctors cannot, they also believed, in large part, that the deity may
intervene through the use of doctors. Siegel, supra at 89-103.
5. For a history of the religious approach to healing, see R. BA"TON, RELIGIOUs Doc-
TRINE AND MEDIcAL PRAcTcIC (1958).
6. Cf. People v. Jordan, 172 Cal. 391, 398, 156 P. 451, 454 (1916); Cawley, Crim-
inal Liability in Faith Healing, 39 MINN. L. REv. 48 (1954) [hereinafter cited as
Cawley].
7. This category includes the well-known Christian Science Church, whose members
believe that disease is a physical manifestation of errors of the mind. See Schneider,
Christian Science and the Law: Room for Compromise?, 1 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB.
81 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Schneider]; Steinhardt, Christian Science: Religious
Freedom and State Control, 7 MtmMi L.Q. 358 (1953).
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similar practical problems: to believers of these sects, there is little or
no distinction between "faith" and "healing," and any government at-
tempt to require medical treatment is considered by them to be an in-
fringement on what they perceive as their constitutional right to practice
their beliefs without governmental interference. Religious beliefs may
also dictate the use of certain drugs or devices, for healing or otherwise,
which are not recognized as useful by medical science,8 or may cause
the believer who otherwise submits himself to medical treatment to re-
fuse the prescribed cure.0 While these cases present a different prob-
lem from that of true "faith healing," they may at times involve
analogous legal problems.
Some religions teach that prayer and faith aid in recovery from ill-
ness. Modern medicine and psychiatry would concur that the patient's
recovery may be hastened and enhanced by faith in the cure.' 0 Most
people, however, think of religion and medicine as operating independ-
ently, and one is not thought to be an appropriate "substitute" for the
other." That the beliefs of most Americans do not conflict with scien-
tific medicine is suggested by the fact that all states have laws regulating
8. E.g., Scientology. See United States v. Article or Device. .. "Hubbard Electro-
meter," 333 F. Supp. 357 (D.D.C. 1971).
9. For example, the Jehovah's Witnesses sect, which permits most medical treatment,
forbids blood transfusions.
10. That the "power of suggestion" can affect even those who believe they have a
thoroughly "scientific" attitude is discussed in Evans, The Power of the Sugar Pill, 7
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Apr., 1974, at 55, and Koenig, Lee's Bilious Pills: The Placebo
Effect in Patent Medicine, 7 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Apr., 1974, at 60 (in which the au-
thor also discusses the regulation of patent medicines by the Food and Drug Administra-
tion).
It is a common misconception that the "power of suggestion!' can only affect "mental"
disease; the functions of "mind" and "body" are not so easily separable. It is well-docu-
mented that apparently psychological factors (ie., 'Yaith") can cause rapid physical
death, Cannon, "Voodoo" Death, 44 AM. ANTHmOPOLOGIST 169 (1942), and disease,
Gillin, Magical Fright, 11 PSYcHIATRY 387 (1948). For a recent discussion of this phe-
nomenon, see Lex, Voodoo Death: New Thoughts on an Old Explanation, 76 AM. AN-
THROPOLOGIsT 888 (1974). Conversely, a belief in the efficacy of the cure may in itself
accelerate the healing process. See generally L. SAuNDERS, CuLTURAL DIFFERENCES AND
MEDICAL CsAM (1954); Torrey, The Case for the Indigenous Therapist, 20 ARcmvnVs
OF GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 365 (1969) (labeling as the "edifice complex" the fact that,
for many people, entering the hospital may have therapeutic value in itself).
11. A line of cases going back to The Queen v. Senior, [1899] 1 Q.B. 283, states
that where a parent has a duty expressed by statute to provide medical care for a child,
nothing else may be substituted. E.g., People v. Arnold, 66 Cal. 2d 438, 452, 426 P.2d
515, 524, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115, 124 (1967); State v. Chenoweth, 71 N.E. 197 (Ind. 1904);
Craig v. State, 155 A.2d 684 (Md. Ct. App. 1959); State v. Watson, 71 A. 1113 (N.J.
1909); Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 29 Pa. County Ct. 65, 67 (1903).
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the practice of the "healing arts."' 2  Further examples of compatibility
include the authority of the states to require vaccination of school chil-
dren,"8 blood tests required to obtain a marriage license,14 and school
medical and dental examinations.' 5 Some states provide exceptions to
12. The California statute provides for the licensing and regulation of the medical
practitioner's activities. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 2135 et seq. (West 1974).
The code specifically states that "treatment by prayer" shall not be prohibited. Id. §
2146.
According to Trescher & O'Neill, Medical Care for Dependent Children: Man-
slaughter Liability of the Christian Scientist, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 203, 216 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Trescher & O'Neill], the typical statutory exemption of spiritual
healing from regulation is an indication of government acceptance of spiritual means of
healing. It is possible in many cases, however, to read the statutes not as "exemptions"
for any particular "method of healing," but simply as the legislatures' recognition of the
danger of potential abuse of first amendment rights under the guise of regulation of a
state interest. For example, California Business and Professions Code section 2146
(CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 2146 (West 1974)) does not "exempt" anything, but
simply makes clear that certain rituals, considered by some to have healing properties,
were never intended to be regulated. Thus, in People v. Jordan, 172 Cal. 391, 156 P.
451 (1916), the court held that the rationale for the prayer "exemption" lies in the fact
that prayer's effectiveness is entirely independent of anatomical knowledge (id. at 396,
156 P. at 453) and that the "exemption" is constitutional since it is "natural," "intrin-
sic," and "reasonable?' (Id. at 398, 156 P. at 454). But see People v. Cosper, 76 Cal.
App. 597, 600, 245 P. 451, 466 (1926) (warning that religion may not be used as a
"mere subterfuge to escape the prohibitory provisions of the Medical Practice Act").
13. California requires that prior to entry in school, children under the age of sixteen
be immunized against measles, CAL. HEALTH & SA"ETY CDE ANN. § 3400 (West Supp.
1975), and polio, id. § 3380. Exceptions are provided where the parent or guardian
files a letter or affidavit stating that immunization is contrary to his religious beliefs.
Id. H9 3404, 3884.
Where no such exceptions are provided, vaccination requirements are often enforced
over the parents' religious objections. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11
(1905), Justice Harlan, speaking for the majority, stressed the state's primary responsi-
bility to look after the common good and stated that "[slociety based on the rule that
each one is a law unto himself would soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy."
Id. at 26. In Tacobson, however, the parents had not presented religion per se as an
excuse, and there was an epidemic of smallpox in the area at the time, a fact which
the Court took into account in weighing the state's interest. Other cases upholding the
state's power to require vaccination include Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944) (dictum); Vonnegut v. Baun, 188 N.E. 677 (Ind. 1934); Hartman v. May, 151
So. 737 (Miss. 1934); State v. Drew, 192 A. 629 (N.H. 1937); In re Whitmore, 47
N.Y.S.2d 143 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1944); City of New Braunfels v. Waldschmidt, 207 S.W.
303 (Tex. 1917).
14. California Civil Code section 4300 requires that blood tests for syphilis be per-
formed by a licensed physician before a marriage license may be issued. CAL. CrvIL
CODE § 4300 (West Supp. 1975). The statute provides no exceptions, but, under an-
other provision, a judge may waive the requirement in case of "emergency or other suffi-
cient cause," provided public health is not endangered. Id. § 4306.
15. In California, although the Department of Public Health has the authority to in-
vestigate diseases related to children (CAL. HEALTH & SAFmY CODE ANN. § 301 (West
1975]
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these and other requirements for some religious groups which oppose
them,' 6 but, particularly at an earlier period when these groups were
less well-known, such regulations caused considerable conflict." 7
The rights guaranteed by the first amendment to the United States
Constitution, including the right to the free exercise of religion, are
among the most highly prized and jealously guarded of American free-
doms. Some legal scholars would go so far as to consider freedom of
religion an almost unqualified right,18 and strong support has existed
throughout our country's history for the concept that freedom of religion
should occupy a "preferred position" in the scheme of American liber-
ties. 1
9
The first amendment provides, in pertinent part: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof . . -. o The courts have consistently viewed
this provision as meaning that the freedom to believe is absolute and
may not be infringed upon, but that "free exercise" does not necessarily
include the right to act on one's beliefs. 2 In deciding what acts may
Supp. 1975)), it has no authority to force compulsory medical or physical examination.
Id. § 302.
16. Trescher & O'Neill, supra note 12, at 215-16, discusses religious exemptions to
Pennsylvania's statutory requirements as indicative of the Pennsylvania legislature's "ap-
proval and acceptance of spiritual means of healing!' and Christian Science in particu-
lar. Many states provide such exemptions for the purpose of avoiding conflicts between
civil authority and religious freedom, but during emergencies, the state's authority is
more likely to be exercised. See, e.g., Vonnegut v. Braun, 188 N.E. 677 (Ind. 1934).
17. See, e.g., cases cited in note 13 supra.
18. The concurring opinion of Justices Black and Douglas in West Virginia State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), states a strong case for first amendment free-
doms short of infringement on the general public welfare:
These laws must, to be consistent with the First Amendment, permit the widest tol-
eration of conflicting viewpoints consistent with a society of free men. . . . The
ceremonial, when enforced against conscientious objectors, more likely to defeat
than to serve its high purpose, is a handy implement for disguised religious perse-
cution. As such, it is inconsistent with our Constitution's plan and purpose.
Id. at 644.
19. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S 105, 115 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1939); United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see Comment, The Drug
Religions and the Free Exercise Clause, 1 U. ToL. L. REV. 202, 204 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Drug Religions].
20. U.S. CoNsr. amend. L For a discussion of the history and background of the
adoption of this portion of the first amendment, see Fernandez, The Free Exercise of
Religion, 36 S. CAL. L. REV. 546 (1963). A recent case, Committee for Pub. Educ.
& Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), discusses the establishment
clause and provides a three-part test for constitutionality. A law must: reflect a clearly
secular legislative purpose; have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits re-
ligion; and avoid excessive entanglement with religion. Id. at 773.
21. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1939); Reynolds v.
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be prohibited, despite the objection that such a prohibition would in-
fringe on religious freedom, the courts have traditionally employed a
balancing test, weighing what the state perceives as its interest in main-
taining a well-ordered society (usually phrased in terms of the "peace
and safety" of the community)2" against the freedom of the individual
to act in accordance with the dictates of his religion 3 and his right to
be left alone.24  Formerly, the courts seemed to place a heavier empha-
sis on the state's regulatory powers, but recent cases, notably Wisconsin
v. Yoder,25 have defined religious freedom in broader terms, allowing
the individual considerable liberty of action where the state's interest
is not seen as "compelling.
'2
Some states, including California, have attempted to ease some of the
apparent conflict by defining "freedom of religion" more narrowly than
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1879). The question of the truth or falsity of reli-
gious beliefs, no matter how "preposterous" they may seem to "most people," may not
be put to the jury. The questions of fraud and good faith, however, are appropriate mat-
ters for the trier of fact. See Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946); United
States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67
(1944); People v. Pierson, 68 N.E. 243 (N.Y. 1903).
22. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1941) (state may prohibit the
public use of "fighting words"); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941) (af-
firming conviction of religious group for parading without a permit); Jacobson v. Massa-
chusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 28 (1905) (see note 13 supra); Hardwick v. Board of School
Trustees, 54 Cal. App. 696, 706, 205 P. 49, 53 (1921) (peace and safety are not jeo-
pardized by children's refusal, on religious grounds, to participate in dancing classes).
23. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1939); Schneider v. New Jersey,
308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939) (city ordinance against distribution of literature held invalid,
as it abridged Jehovah's Witnesses' rights of free speech).
24. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); cf. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1966). Few court decisions discuss a
"right to be left alone" in relation to the freedom to practice religious beliefs. Perhaps
they feel the problem is fully covered by the first amendment. However, then-Judge
Burger, in his dissenting opinion in the denial of rehearing of Application of President &
Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1010, 1016-17 (D.C. Cir. 1964),
quoted Justice Brandeis' views on privacy as expressed in Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438 (1928), to support application of a "right to be left alone" to all thoughts and
feelings: "I suggest he [Brandeis] intended to include a great many foolish, unreason-
able and even absurd ideas which do not conform, such as refusing medical treatment
even at great risk." Id. at 1017.
A 1972 amendment to the California constitution added a specific provision guaran-
teeing all people an inalienable right to privacy. CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 1. See gener-
ally Comment, Unauthorized Rendition of Lifesaving Medical Treatment, 53 CALIF. L.
Rlv. 860, 874 (1965) (hereinafter cited as Unauthorized Rendition].
25. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
26. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963); see Giannella, Religious Liberty,
Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development (pts. 1 & 2), 80 HARv. L. REv. 1381
(1967), 81 HAnv. L. Rav. 513 (1968).
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does the United States Constitution.27  The California constitution
states that the freedom to practice one's religion is "not. .. construed
as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with
the peace or safety of this state."
28
The criteria used in the balancing test, by both the state and federal
courts, include the necessity of the particular practice to the "central
core" of the belief system, 29 the degree of impact the behavior is
thought (by the court) to have on society as a whole,30 and the bona
fides of the individual's belief in the necessity of the practice (al-
though the factual content of the beliefs themselves may never be
called into questions2). The Supreme Court has at times, however,
drawn a somewhat puzzling distinction between "religion" and "mor-
als," holding that "morals" are more easily regulated s8
When the believer in faith healing, or his child, becomes ill and does
not go through what the majority of society, and the government, con-
27. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4. Similar provisions are found in many state constitutions.
E.g., ILL. CONsT. art. I, § 3; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 3. Of course, since the first amend-
ment is applicable to the states, state constitutional provisions cannot limit rights secured
by the United States Constitution.
28. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4. The California Attorney General concluded that the re-
ligious use of peyote would not be permitted under this provision (39 Op. CAL. ATr'Y
GEN. 276 (1962)), a view later rejected by the California Supreme Court in People v.
Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964), and In re Grady, 61
Cal. 2d 887, 394 P.2d 728, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1964). The Attorney General considered
the California qualification to be "implied" in the United States Constitution. 39 Op.
CAL. ATr'y GnN. at 277. Although this provision would seem to give the California
constitution a potentially more restrictive application than is apparent on the face of
the United States Constitution's first amendment, in fact the policy considerations are
much the same.
29. See People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964);
Davis, Plural Marriage and Religious Freedom: The Impact of Reynolds v. United
States, 15 Asuz. L. RFv. 287 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Davis].
30. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); see note 165 infra and accompany-
ing text. The "Sunday closing law" cases are illustrative. McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961), Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366
U.S. 582, 590 (1961), Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 613 (1961), and Gallagher
v. Crown Kosher Supermarket of Massachusetts, Inc., 366 U.S. 617, 622-23 (1961), hold
that a law which does not compel a repugnant belief, nor prohibit outright a religious
practice, does not violate the free exercise of religion and will be upheld if the state
can show some valid secular goal.
31. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
32. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953); United States v. Ballard, 322
U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944).
33. Of particular significance in this respect are the Mormon polygamy cases, where
the Court has consistently held that the state's interest in protecting public health, safety
and morals outweighs the individual's interest in practicing what to him is a religious
belief:
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sider the "proper channels" to be cured, he may find himself caught
up in a conflict between two of the most highly valued ideals in the
American system-freedom of religion and the "sanctity" of human
life. From society's standpoint, the problem is most acute when a child
is involved. There the state may step in, in its role as parens patriae,
declare the child "neglected," and hand him over for treatment, regard-
less of the parents' religious beliefY4 This is a drastic step and one
which the courts are naturally reluctant to take. In the case of an adult
believer who appears to be of sound mind, there is more of a "hands-
off' attitude, but the courts will, at times, step in when they fear that
a life hangs in the balance. 5 Under ordinary circumstances, however,
the case of a true believer in faith healing will not even come to the
To permit this would make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to
the law of the land, and in effect permit every citizen to become a law unto him-
self. Government could exist only in name under such circumstances.
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1879); see Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333
(1890) (religion is no defense to a criminal charge).
Both Reynolds and Davis draw analogy to the religious practice of human sacrifice,
which, the Court says, would be banned under any circumstances. Davis, in a most cur-
iously reasoned opinion, goes on to state that "[tio call [the] advocacy [of polygamy]
a tenet of religion is to offend the common sense of mankind." 133 U.S. at 341-42.
To follow this reasoning, a state could declare any practice it found "odious" a crime,
and forbid it. The same panel, in Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890), upheld the power of Congress,
in organizing the territorial government of Utah, to modify or revoke the charter of the
Church because it advocated polygamy, "a crime against the laws, and abhorrent to the
sentiments and feelings of the civilized world," and altogether a "barbarous" practice.
Id. at 48. The Late Corporation was possessed of considerable interests in land which,
on its demise, would escheat to the grantor-the United States. For an historical back-
ground of these cases, the political compromises which resulted, and their impact on
modem law, see Cawley, supra note 6; Davis, supra note 29.
The problem did not die with the Mormon Church's official ban on the practice of
polygamy. It is still practiced by some members of the so-called "Fundamentalist sect"
of the Mormon Church, one of whom was convicted of violating the Mann Act
(18 U.S.C. § 2421 et seq. (1970)). The Supreme Court held that "[wihether an act
is immoral within the meaning of the statute is not to be determined by the accused's
concepts of morality. Congress has provided the standard." Cleveland v. United States,
329 U.S. 14, 20 (1946). The courts may not judge whether or not a belief is "religious,"
but may decide whether or not it is "moral," the distinction being somewhat vague. Jus-
tice Murphy dissented, alluding to cultural factors and urging that the religious beliefs
and social mores of the accused's society be taken into account. Id. at 24-29.
One commentator defines the term "faith healing' to apply only to members of sects
which believe in healing exclusively by prayer. Cawley, supra note 6, at 48. In prac-
tice, however, such a belief is rare. See note 4 supra. The legal problems are the same,
even if the religion does not strictly forbid the use of scientific medicine. The religion
may be the cause of failure to seek medical attention in time to effectuate a cure, or
may prevent the patient from making full use of the available medical remedies.
34. See, e.g., In re Green, 292 A.2d 387 (Pa. 1972).
35. See note 74 infra and accompanying text.
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attention of the authorities, unless and until someone dies. Those who
recover have had their beliefs reinforced, and no one complains.30
Consider the following hypothetical case. A young child is the victim
of severe diabetes; doctors prescribe frequent injections of insulin to
keep the child alive. The child and his parents are members of a re-
ligious group which believes in the power of "divine healing" but also
believes in the efficacy of drugs, under certain conditions, and does not
forbid the injections. One Sunday in church a visiting preacher ad-
dresses the congregation on the subject of healing through faith. He
describes his own recovery from paralysis, accomplished through the
power of faith alone, but neglects to mention that he was in the hospital
at the time of the cure. The preacher does not touch the child, but
does suggest 'that the .taking of medication may indicate a lack of true
faith. The meeting generates much excitement. Active participation
and "speaking in tongues" are encouraged by the sect. In response
to the preacher's message, the congregation prays together, and the
child begins to feel that something inside him is changing. Later, he
announces to his friends that he is "cured." The insulin is thrown
away. The next day the child feels worse, but the family, advised by
members of their church group, decides not to give the medication.
They feel that the child has probably been cured and that the medicine
could not help at this point and might possibly be harmful. The minis-
ter is aware of, but takes no active part in, these activities. Within
three days, the child is dead. The congregation continues to pray that
he might be brought back to life. The preacher quietly leaves town.1
7
What potential criminal liabilities stem from such a case? 8  Would
36. See L. SAUNDERS, CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AN MEDICAL CARE 144-45 (1954)
(comparing "folk" and "scientific" medical treatments and concluding that the prestige
of both systems derives from the fact that most patients get well no matter what is done
to them).
37. Based in part on the facts of People v. Parker, No. CR 29566 (Super. Ct., San
Bernardino County, Cal. 1974), as they appeared in the Los Angeles Times (Aug. 26,
1973, § 1, at 3, col. 1, & 19, col. 1; Aug. 27, 1973, § 2, at 1, col. 3, & 4, col. 7; Aug. 30,
1973, § 1, at 3, col. 1, & 28, col. 1). Embellishments are the author's own, and the
"case" as it appears is fictional. In the actual case, the parents were found guilty of
involuntary manslaughter and felony child abuse. Los Angeles Times, July 20, 1974,
§ 1, at 24, cols. 7-8. The "preacher" testified at the trial.
38. Potential civil liability, if any, is beyond the scope of this Comment. In a civil
action for assault and battery, consent is a complete defense, whether or not the act is
illegal. Sayadoff v. Warda, 125 Cal. App. 2d 626, 271 P.2d 140 (1954). It is possible
to imagine a situation, analogous to a doctor-patient relationship, in which a "quack"
could be liable in tort for failure to warn of a known risk, or for going beyond the scope
of the "patient's" consent. However, criminal liability also attaches in these situations.
See, e.g., State v. Karsunky, 84 P.2d 390 (Wash. 1938). The bona fide faith healer
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the problem be significantly different if an adult, rather than a child,
had died? If the "healer" or the pastor of the church had taken a more
active role, had diagnosed the source of the disease in a non-conven-
tional way, had prescribed any medication or mode of treatment, or had
charged a fee for his services? If the child had not died, but had be-
come crippled or more seriously ill, or if the disease, although not fatal,
would subject the child to medically preventable pain, or shorten his
life considerably?
This Comment will address itself to these questions in light of the
current judicial attitude toward freedom of religion.
1. TlE BEL EVERS
A. The Parents Liability
The parents may be found guilty of child neglect, whether or not
the child dies as the result of faith healing treatments, if the trier of
fact finds that the situation was one in which medical attention would
normally be required. The prosecution, however, has the burden of
proving that the treatment was strictly necessary, and that burden is fre-
quently difficult to sustain. 9 The basis of liability in this situation is
generally a statute which charges the parents with a legal duty to pro-
vide food, clothing, shelter, medical attention, and other necessities of
life to the child. 40 The cases are consistent only in that they almost
uniformly reject "freedom of religion" as a defense to this charge.41 If
who uses no drugs is not analogous to a doctor in this regard, since he disclaims per-
sonal responsibility. He does not purport to cure through his own superior knowledge,
but claims, at most, to be a vehicle of divine power, which performs the actual healing.
In the case of a child, parental consent should be sufficient to bar an assault and bat-
tery or wrongful death action in tort. Moreover, if the beneficiaries of a wrongful death
action were in any way responsible for the death, they may be barred from bringing
the action. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 913 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PRossER]. Therefore, the only case in which any potential recov-
ery for wrongful death may lie is a situation where treatment is performed without con-
sent.
39. People v. Yates, 114 Cal. App. 782, 298 P. 96 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1931); State
v. Beach, 329 S.W.2d 712 (Mo. 1959).
40. Section 270 of the California Penal Code provides:
If a parent of a minor child willfully omits, without lawful excuse, to furnish nec-
essary clothing, food, shelter or medical attendance, or other remedial care for his
or her child, he or she is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not exceed-
ing one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in the county jail not ex-
ceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1975). For summaries of the early English com-
mon law and the effects of these statutes, see Trescher & O'Neill, supra note 12; Note,
Juveniles: The Child, Medicine and the Law, 39 Miss. L.J. 508 (1968).
41. People v. Arnold, 66 Cal. 2d 438, 426 P.2d 515, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1967); State
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the child dies, the parents may be charged with manslaughter, the stat-
ute being the basis for the legal duty from which criminal neglect may
be inferred.42
The California case of People v. Arnold" illustrates the position of
a parent who believes in faith healing. Mrs. Arnold had been charged
with and convicted of involuntary manslaughter in the death of her
daughter, under California Penal Code section 270.4' At the time of
her death, the girl was attended only by her mother and the elders of
the "Church of the First Born," who believe in faith healing. The
court of appeal explained the basis for liability:
It is the duty of one having legal and physical custody of a minor
child to furnish it with necessary medical aid in event of illness, and
if such person neglects to furnish such aid and as a proximate cause
of that failure death occurs, involuntary manslaughter has been com-
mitted.45
v. Chenoweth, 71 N.E. 197 (Ind. 1904); Craig v. State, 155 A.2d 684 (Md. Ct. App.
1959); State v. Watson, 71 A. 1113 (N.J. 1909); Commonwealth v. Breth, 44 Pa.
County Ct. 56 (1915); Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 29 Pa. County Ct. 65 (1903); see
Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 483, 516-17 (1965) (citing a number of cases in discussing
whether or not religion is a defense). While State v. Sandford, 59 A. 597 (Me. 1904),
is often cited as supporting religion as a defense, the facts of the case do not support
such a general proposition. First, the leader of a religious community, not a parent,
was on trial, and, second, the issue on appeal was a misleading jury instruction, not
whether religion may be a defense to child neglect charges. Dictum in the case does
suggest that religion may be available as a defense to child neglect charges. Id. at
601.
42. See The Queen v. Senior, [1899] 1 Q.B. 283. Each of the fifty states and Can-
ada have similar child protection statutes. Cawley, supra note 6, at 54-57. California
Penal Code section 272 provides in part:
Every person who commits an act or omits the performance of any duty, which
act or omission tends to cause or encourage any person under the age of twenty-
one years to come within the provisions of Sections 600, 601, or 602 of the Welfare
and Institutions Code. . . is guilty of a misdemeanor ....
CAL. PENAL CoDE § 272 (West 1972). California Welfare and Institutions Code section
600 provides in part:
Any person under the age of eighteen years who comes within any of the follow-
ing descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge
such person to be a dependent child of the court:
(b) who is. . . not provided with the necessities of life ....
CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 600 (West 1972).
Under California law, a person who kills another may be guilty of involuntary man-
slaughter if the killing occurs "in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to
a felony, or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlaw-
ful manner, or without due caution and circumspection ... ." CAL. PENAL CoDE § 192
(West 1972).
43. 47 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1966).
44. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 270, 272 (West 1972); see note 40 supra.
45. 47 Cal. Rptr. at 527-28.
FAITH HEALING
The opinion of the court of appeal was vacated, and the California
Supreme Court reversed ,Mrs. Arnold's conviction, finding that state-
ments were introduced at trial in violation of Escobedo v. Illinois.
4 6
The Arnold case might at first glance appear anomalous in that it
states a rule of law (a person who neglects his duty to another com-
mits manslaughter if that neglect proximately causes the other's
death47), and then proceeds to avoid it on other grounds (no matter how
well justified in the particular instance). However, a reading of the
cases in which similar charges have been brought reveals a surprising
number in which manslaughter or criminal neglect convictions have
been reversed on appeal, often on grounds unrelated to the charge it-
self. 48 This may reflect an unstated judicial policy of sympathy for the
46. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). The court also relied on People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338,
398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965), which along with Escobedo provides that an
accused be advised of her rights to counsel and to remain silent.
47. 66 Cal. 2d at 442-43, 426 P.2d at 517-18, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 117-18.
48. People v. Pierson, 68 N.E. 243 (N.Y. 1903), is a leading case. Despite the fact
that the child died, the father in Pierson was charged and convicted, not of homicide,
but of a misdemeanor violation of the child neglect statute. Craig v. State, 155 A.2d
684 (Md. Ct. App. 1959), in a similar fact situation, held that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to show proximate cause because by the time it became apparent that the child
was dying, he might have been beyond help. See generally People v. Arnold, 66 Cal.
2d 438, 426 P.2d 515, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1967); Bradley v. State, 84 So. 677 (Fla.
1920) (the neglect did not "cause" the death, despite the fact that it may have acceler-
ated it); State v. Chenoweth, 71 N.E. 197 (Ind. 1904) (father acquitted); State v. Sand-
ford, 59 A. 597 (Me. 1905) (religious leader's conviction reversed; jury instructions re-
quired the jury to rule according to its belief in the efficacy of prayer); State v. Beach,
329 S.W.2d 712 (Mo. 1959) (reversal of mother's conviction due to insufficient evidence
suggests that a very clear-cut case would be necessary to sustain conviction); State v.
Watson, 71 A. 1113 (N.J. 1909) (both parents' manslaughter convictions reversed be-
cause the jury did not have the opportunity to decide whether the negligence was "will-
ful"); Beck v. State, 233 P. 495 (Okla. Crim. Ct. App. 1925) (homicide not charged;
father found guilty of a misdemeanor violation of the child neglect statute; the appellate
court, while affirming the conviction, found that the sentence of the trial court, $50 fine
and 6 nonths in jail, was too harsh, and modified it to a $50 fine only); Owens v. State,
116 P. 345 (Okla. Crim. Ct. App. 1911) (father's misdemeanor conviction for child ne-
glect affirmed although opinion does not indicate whether or not the child died); State
v. Barnes, 212 S.W. 100 (Tenn. 1919) (father's indictment on homicide charge upheld,
but there is no record of the outcome of the trial).
An exhaustive search has failed to turn up a single appellate case upholding a parent
or guardian's conviction on homicide charges, where religion was presented as a defense.
Two cases widely quoted for the proposition that such a result is "the law" are Common-
wealth v. Breth, 44 Pa. County Ct. 56 (1915), and Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 29 Pa.
County Ct. 65 (1903). Both are Pennsylvania trial court opinions. Some commenta-
tors believe that these cases no longer reflect Pennsylvania law:
"[W]hile a conviction of involuntary manslaughter may, under some circum-
stances be predicated upon death attributable to the failure to provide medical care,
the character of the ailment, the good faith of the parent is of supreme importance.
If the failure to provide medical care is the result of religious tenet or sincere belief
1975] ,
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plight of parents who are caught between the law of the land and the
firm belief that their way of healing is the right one and the one most
beneficial to their children's welfare. 49  The stated policy of the law
seems clear, however-the saving of a life, particularly the life of a
child, takes precedence over religious beliefs.
In cases where the child's disease is not immediately fatal, the law
gives the parents much greater freedom to follow their religious convic-
tions, particularly since the alternative, declaring the child neglected
and taking it out of the parents' care, is acceptable to most courts only
in the most extreme circumstances.
The recent Pennsylvania case of In re Green5" illustrates a modem
court's decision when faced with the conflict between a parent's reli-
gious belief51 and the state's interest in regulating public health and
safety. Ricky Green was unable to stand or walk, and his situation
could have been alleviated by surgery, but the operation was not,
strictly speaking, necessary to save his life.52 Ricky's mother could not,
in conscience, consent to the blood transfusions necessary to make the
surgery reasonably safe.
5 3
Was Ricky neglected? The court held that he was not, because his
life was not in danger.54 The court discussed the cases which discrim-
inate between the right -to believe and the right to 'act on those beliefs, 5
in the inefficacy of the medical treatment there may be no criminal responsibility
under the law."
Trescher & O'Neill, supra note 12, at 217, quoting Commonwealth v. Cornelius, No. 105,
Apr. Sess. (Quar. Sess. Ct. 1956) (Reimel, J., oral opinion). If this statement reflects
Pennsylvania law, it represents a departure from the traditional rule. It may, however,
be consistent with the unstated policy, if not the letter, of previous law. In Common-
wealth v. Sheridan, No. 26307 (Super. Ct, Barnstable County, Mass. Nov. 1967) (see
L. WEINREB, CQflNAL LAw 179-83 (1969)), a Christian Scientist was convicted of
manslaughter in the death of her five-year-old daughter from complications of pneu-
monia. Mrs. Sheridan was placed on probation for 5 years, without imposition of sen-
tence. If this is the typical disposition of this type of case, it is no wonder that they
seldom seem to go up on appeal.
49. See 9 DEPAUL L. RFv. 271 (1960) (suggesting that although religion is "no de-
fense" to a criminal neglect charge, it is nonetheless the "best defense").
50. 292 A.2d 387 (Pa. 1972).
51. The mother was a Jehovah's Witness. She did not object to medical treatment
per se, but refused to agree to blood transfusions, without which the doctors felt the
needed surgery would be excessively dangerous. Id. at 388. Her situation is analogous to
that of believers in faith healing in that, under the circumstances, the cure was in direct
conflict with her beliefs. The major distinction here is that a believer in faith healing
might not have presented the child to the doctor in the first place.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 392.
55. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
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and distinguished them, relying on recent Supreme Court cases defin-
ing the scope of the first amendment freedoms.5 6 The court theorized
that Ricky's condition, however painful to himself, was not a substantial
threat to society.
57
The Green holding is a departure from the rationale, if not the end
result, of the earlier cases. The Supreme Court, in Prince v. Massachu-
setts,58 while not directly concerned with a child's physical health, dis-
cussed at length the "accommodation" between freedom of religion and
the exercise of state authority and concluded that "[t]he state's author-
ity over children's activities is broader than over like actions of
adults," 59 since the future of society is seen to depend on the well-
rounded growth of young people. 60 Both the majority and dissenting
opinions in Prince use the criterion of danger to the individual child's
welfare,"1 which seems to be rejected by the Pennsylvania court in
Green.
62
If the Supreme Court were to follow the Green rationale, which ap-
parently allows for greater individual choice, it would probably make
little practical difference, since Green makes it clear that if a life were
immediately in danger, a court would be more likely to step in.6"
Traditionally the parents have been allowed considerable discretion
in the choice of remedy where the condition does not involve serious
risk of life, particularly where the medical remedy is itself inherently
dangerous."4 However, the New York case of In re Sampson, 5 de-
(1939); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1879).
56. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963).
57. 292 A.2d at 389. The case was remanded, in part, to determine Ricky's wishes,
since he was an "intelligent child of sufficient maturity," sixteen years of age, and the
record on appeal did not indicate whether or not he belonged to, or believed in, the re-
ligion in question. Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241-49 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting in part).
58. 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (statute forbidding a minor from selling religious literature
does not violate freedom of religion).
59. Id. at 165, 168.
60. Id. at 165.
61. Id. at 166-67; id. at 174-75 (dissent); see Note, The Right to Die, 18 U. FLA.
L. RFv. 591, 593 (1966).
62. 292 A.2d at 391-92.
63. Id.
64. See In re Seiferth, 127 N.E.2d 820, 822-25 (N.Y. 1955) (appointment of guard-
ian to be reserved for "drastic situation"); In re Tuttendario, 21 Pa. Dist. 561 (Quar.
Sess. Ct. 1912) (parents feared surgery might kill the child); In re Hudson, 126 P.2d
765, 777-78 (Wash. 1942) (amputation of a congenitally deformed arm; the child's life
not immediately in danger); Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 1138 (1953). But see People ex rel.
1975]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8
cided the same year as Green, held that the state has the authority to
compel a dangerous procedure for only a partial cure, without the con-
sent of either parent or child, the child's right to lead a normal life tak-
ing precedence over the mother's religious beliefs."" Green and Samp-
son appear to be in direct conflict, with the New York court allowing
far less freedom of individual choice, at least where a child is involved.
Thus, the Sampson decision is probably in line with the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Prince,7 but might not be upheld in light of the
more recent cases of Sherbert v. Verner 8 and Wisconsin v. Yoder,09
Wallace v. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769, 773 (Il1.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952) (fail-
ure to authorize transfusion held to be neglect, authorizing appointment of guardian);
accord, State v. Perricone, 181 A.2d 751, 755 (NJ. 1962); Hoener v. Bertinato, 171
A.2d 140 (N.J. Juv. & Doam. Rel. Ct. 1961) (unborn child); Mitchell v. Davis, 205
S.W.2d 812, 819 (Tex. Civ. App. CL 1947).
65. 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (App. Div. 1971), af'd sub nom. Sampson v. Taylor, 278 N.E.
2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972). The mother objected only to the transfusion, not
to the surgery thought necessary to enable the child to lead a normal life. The appel-
late court opinion, in affirming the order, stressed that the trial court had seen the boy
(age 15) and taken his interests into account and that he was being declared "ne-
glected" for this limited purpose only. See 77 DicINsoN L. Rav. 693 (1973).
66. 323 N.Y.S.2d at 255; see 77 DIcKINsON L. REv. 693 (1973) (discussing Sampson
and Green).
67. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
68. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Mrs. Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist
Church, was discharged by her employer because she followed the dictates of her reli-
gion by refusing to work on Saturday. She was denied unemployment compensation by
the state of South Carolina on the ground that she would not "accept 'suitable work
when offered."' Id. at 401. The Supreme Court held that the state unemployment com-
pensation act was unconstitutional as applied to her, since there was no "compelling state
interest" which could justify such a "substantial infringement of appellant's First
Amendment right." Id. at 406.
The Sherbert "compelling state interest" test does not rely on the action-belief di-
chotomy expressed in earlier cases such as Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1879). See cases cited in note 33 supra. The test defined in Sherbert should make it
more difficult for a state to infringe on religiously-motivated actions. This comment
must be tempered with the notation that Sherbert did not directly raise issues of public
health, safety or welfare, nor did it involve criminal activity.
69. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The Yoder case represents the Supreme Court's application
of the Sherbert "compelling state interest" test to a criminal case. Defendants were
members of the Old Order Amish religion, which teaches avoidance of "worldly" influ-
ence. They were convicted of violating Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law
by refusing to send their children to school beyond the eighth grade. They sincerely
believed that high school attendance would endanger the children's salvation. The
Court held that, although the state did have a legitimate interest in enforcing school at-
tendance, its interest must be balanced against the rights of the individual. The Yoder
test makes it clear that the state must show either that it does not deny the free exercise
of religion, or that there is a state interest of "sufficient magnitude to override the inter-
est claiming protection" under the first amendment. Id. at 214. The state failed to
carry its burden in the Yoder case. "[O]nly those interests of the highest order and
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which allow for greater individual liberty where there is no substantial
threat to society at large.70 An example of "substantial threat" might
well involve a child suffering from a highly contagious disease, and ex-
ceptions probably will continue to be made where immediate action,
over parental objections, may actually save the child's life.
The United States Supreme Court has never specifically addressed
this issue.71 However, the Yoder case, while rejecting the older ration-
ale that the state is free to regulate religiously-motivated actions, quali-
fies that statement by saying that such actions will remain subject to
the states' "undoubted power to promote health, safety and general
welfare."
72
B. The Case of the Adult Believer
When an adult refuses medical treatment, the problem is somewhat
different. The state does not profess to have as much -authority over
the behavior of adults as it does over that of children,78 but the high
value which American culture traditionally has placed on the individual
human life may, under some circumstances, cause a court to intervene
when it feels that an adult's life hangs in the balance.74  As a general
rule, a court will not order treatment of an apparently sane adult against
his will. 75 In fact, it is difficult to find justification for judicial interven-
tion in light of the established rule that a physician may incur tort lia-
bility for unauthorized treatment,76 particularly in a non-emergency sit-
uation.77  However, if the adult appears to be near death or non
those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of re-
ligion." Id. at 215.
70. See generally 77 DicK. L. REv. 693 (1973).
71. Schneider, supra note 7, at 85.
72. 406 U.S. at 220, citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), and Rey-
nolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
73. In Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), the Court stated:
Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they
are free, in identical circumstances, .to make martyrs of their children before they
have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice
for themselves.
Id. at 170.
74. The best examples are the blood transfusion cases, since they are the most likely
to come to the courts' attention in time to make the choice. E.g., Application of Presi-
dent & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 978 (1964).
75. See In re Brooks' Estate, 205 N.E.2d 435 (l. 1965) (order vacated subsequent
to transfusion; the patient lived); Erickson v. Dilgard, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. CL 1962)
(the patient later died).
76. PRossnn, supra note 38, at 102.
77. Unauthorized Rendition, supra note 24, at 862. See also Kelly, The Physician, the
Patient, and Consent, 8 KA. L. -Rv. 405 (1960).
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compos mentis,rs a court might "imply" consent despite the patient's
expressed denial of consent, refusing to accept evidence that the pa-
tient, on religious grounds, would not have consented. 79 In fact, the
much-discussed "right to die"80 seems not to exist under current law,
except in the most limited of circumstances."' It certainly seems to be
the case that once a person, adult or child, is under a doctor's care,
the courts will be most reluctant to allow him to "demand mistreat-
ment.
8 2
What of the true believer who does not submit himself to medical
care at all? If there were a consistent overriding social interest in favor
of keeping people alive, one would expect to find legal sanctions for
those faith healers who counsel others to refrain from medical treat-
ment.s3 These tools do not exist, however, and in fact the policy of
the law seems to be to the contrary. The Supreme Court has said that
an adult is free to be a "martyr" if he so chooses.8 4 Nevertheless, when
78. Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964) (to refuse to act, only to find later that
the law required action, was a risk the court was unwilling to take); Raleigh Fitkin-
Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537 (N.J.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
985 (1964) (pregnant woman; blood necessar to save both mother and child); Collins
v. Davis, 254 N.Y.S.2d 666 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (patient comatose; doctors considered his
wife's reason for refusal "medically unsound").
79. Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964). But see Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d
65, 68-70 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971) ("a finding of 'mental illness'
.. . does not cause even a presumption that the patient is 'incompetent' or unable ade-
quately to manage his own affairs," distinguishing Georgetown on the basis that "ex-
treme circumstances" were not present).
80. See Note, The Dying Patient: A Qualified Right to Refuse Medical Treatment,
7 J. FAMILY L. 644 (1968); Unauthorized Rendition, supra note 24; Comment, The
Right to Die, 9 UTAH L. R v. 161 (1964) (discussing the possibility that a court could,
on the proper occasion, simply wait until the patient is near death, declare him mentally
incompetent, and order treatment without authorization).
81. Erickson v. Dilgard, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705, 706 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (uncertainties of
medical prognostication allow the patient to make the ultimate decision to accept or re-
ject blood).
82. United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752, 754 (D. Conn. 1965); cf. Application
of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1008 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964) ("if. . . a parent has no power to forbid the saving
of his child's life, a fortiori the husband of the patient here had no right to order the
doctors to treat his wife in a way so that she would die").
83. An analogy is sometimes made to old laws against suicide. Cf. Unauthorized
Rendition, supra note 24, at 869-72.
84. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944). Cawley, supra note 6, at 69,
mentions two cases, both apparently widely-reported in the newspapers and magazines
at the time (1952), in which adults were allowed to die, in accordance with their reli-
gious beliefs. Since the policy of the law is not to interfere, there are no prosecutions
and hence no record of the frequency of this type of event.
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an adult engages in an activity which the state feels empowered to regu-
late on the grounds of public health or safety, the individual's freedom
to practice in accordance with his belief may be curtailed."5
Therefore, despite an apparent change in the policy of the law as
reflected by Sherbert and Yoder, the actual working of the law in re-
gard to believers is likely to remain the same. The health and safety
of the community and child, and of adults in limited circumstances, are
likely to remain "compelling state interests. 8 8
UIE THE FAITH HEALERS
A. What is a "Faith Healer"?
A strict definition of "faith healer" would include only those who at-
tempt to heal by faith and prayer alone and who assist or counsel others
in faith healing methods.87 However, the various religions differ in
their approaches to healing. The so-called Pentecostal sects 8 have
85. The "snake-handling" cases illustrate the willingness of the state to step in when
it feels that a real threat to public safety exists. Certain sects of the so-called "Holi-
ness Churches," Christian fundamentalists, believe that they are commanded by Jesus'
words (Mark 16:17-18) to handle poisonous snakes. They believe that, as a form of
evangelism, they must perform the ritual in public, to strengthen the faith of others. See
Harden v. State, 216 S.W.2d 708, 709 (Tenn. 1948). Snake handling is a central
tenet of their religion. They believe that, if their faith is strong enough, they will not
be bitten, or, if they are, they will suffer no ill-effects. They also believe in faith heal-
ing. The snakes do present a real danger to the handlers, and also, at times, to the
audience. See Hill v. State, 88 So. 2d 880 (Ala. CL App.), cert. denied, 88 So. 2d 887
(Ala. 1956). Between 1940 and 1955, when the movement was at its height, at least
sixteen persons are known to have died from the effects of snake bites received at snake-
handling meetings. The founder of the cult died of a rattlesnake bite in 1955. The
cult still exists. W. LABRAR, THE GHosT DANCE 625-28 (Delta ed. 1972).
A number of states enacted laws forbidding the handling of snakes. The Tennessee
statute is typical. It provides, in relevant part, that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, or persons, to display, exhibit, handle, or use
any poisonous or dangerous snake or reptile in such a manner as to endanger the
life or health of any person.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2208 (1955). These laws were clearly aimed at the snake cul-
tists and were immediately challenged. The Tennessee statute passed the test of consti-
tutionality in Harden v. State, 216 S.W.2d 708 (Tenn. 1956). Substantially similar laws
were upheld in Alabama (Hill v. State, 88 So. 2d 880 (Ala. Ct. App.), cert. denied,
88 So. 2d 887 (Ala. 1956)) and North Carolina (State v. Massey, 51 S.E.2d 179
(N.C.), appeal dismissed sub. nom. Bunn v. North Carolina, 336 U.S. 942 (1949)). A
Kentucky statute, which forbade handling of snakes at religious gatherings only and
which was not limited to poisonous or dangerous reptiles, was upheld in Lawson v. Com-
monwealth, 164 S.W.2d 972 (Ky. Ct. App. 1942).
86. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-32 (1972) (dictum).
87. See note 4 supra.
88. See generally Pattison, supra note 4; Siegel, supra note 4.
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some members who actively seek and encourage "divine intervention,"
but they do not ordinarily perform acts that are thought to "heal" a sick
person. In this sense, there are no "healers"; the cure is thought to
come directly from God. The term "healer" 0 should properly be re-
served for a person who performs some act, or purports to have some
special power, to attract divine attention.
A "healing" in the Pentecostal sense does not necessarily result in
a change in symptomatology, either outwardly or in the patient's per-
ception. In other words, the patient's belief in the reality of the "cure"
is not affected by the fact that he may feel no immediate remission of
symptoms, as he may believe that they will go away gradually. The
results of at least one study indicate that a believer would be likely to
try faith healing first and would consult a doctor only if faith did not
produce an adequate cure.90 Such situations may lead to a potentially
lethal mistake of fact as to when medical attention is required.
An adult has considerable freedom to believe as he wishes and to
act on those beliefs, so long as he is not endangering others0 ' or break-
ing a law. However, if the faith healer counsels a believer in the
breaking of any law, or violates a law himself, he may be subject to
liability.92 It may be difficult to determine if and when a law has been
violated, since much may depend on the good faith of the parties."8
The crucial question is to what extent a court should be able to inter-
fere with an adult's freedom to believe, even if he chooses to believe
in what may seem to others to be a fraudulent scheme. Where children
are involved the problem is less difficult,9" especially since parents,
when a child's life is involved, may be especially susceptible to persua-
sion by one who promises a "miraculous" cure-whether he be a
"quack '95 or a genuine believer in the efficacy of faith treatment.
Our hypothetical case96 did not reveal the intentions of the faith
healer, and money was not mentioned. These factors make a differ-
ence in several circumstances. If his intent is to defraud, the "healer"
89. For example, "spiritualists" who perform rituals to invoke spirit help. See gener-
ally Lubchansky, Egri & Stokes, Puerto Rican Spiritualists View Mental Illness: The
Faith Healer as a Paraprofessional, 127 AM. J. PsYCHIATRY, Sept., 1970, at 312.
90. Siegel, supra note 4, at 89-103.
91. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (see note 73 supra).
92. See Cawley, supra note 6.
93. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
94. See notes 39-69 supra and accompanying text.
95. See Note, Quackery in California, 11 STAN. L. Rnv. 265, 266 (1959) (defining
"quack" as a medical fraud and discussing the problem).
96. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
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is clearly liable whether the "patient' is an adult or a child. 97  If the
"healer" has done anything to resemble "practicing medicine," he may
be liable for violation of the medical licensing statutes.98 If he has
counseled a parent to disobey the statute imposing a duty to provide
medical care to a child, he may be subject to criminal liability as an
accessory to the crime regardless of his intent.99
B. Liability Under the Licensing Statutes
California Business and Professions Code sections 2135-2148,00 pro-
vide for the licensing of practitioners of the "healing arts.""'z~ "Practic-
ing medicine" includes holding oneself out as a medical professional,
10 2
whether or not one actually claims to be a physician.103 Compensation
is not a necessary element of practicing, 10 4 but ordinarily, giving simple
gratuitous aid or advice would not be considered "practicing medi-
97. See, e.g., People v. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d 574, 414 P.2d 353, 51 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1966); note 130 infra.
98. See notes 101-48 infra and accompanying text.
99. Although the parents may be prosecuted, the faith healer appears to be free from
liability of any kind in this situation. Cawley, .supra note 6, at 70-74. In Canada, how-
ever, one who counsels his followers to rely on prayer and to deny medical aid to chil-
dren, may be liable as an accessory before the fact (or possibly a principal). Id., citing
Regina v. Beer, 32 Can. L.J. 416 (1895) (acquitted); Rex v. Brooks, [1902] 9 B.C. 13
(convicted of aiding and abetting); Rex v. Elder, [1925] 35 Man. 161 (conviction re-
versed on other grounds); see CAL. PENAL CODE § 31 (West 1972) (providing that one
who counsels the commission of crime by fraud is a principal). Cawley recommends
such a position for United States law. Cawley, supra note 6, at 74. It is more difficult
to be sympathetic to Cawley's position where adults are concerned. One would expect
that a person who honestly believes that his method of healing is the most efficacious
one would recommend it to adults and children alike, and, therefore, society would hesi-
tate, on first amendment grounds, to interfere with this belief. See Wright, Book Re-
view, 38 MINN. L. Rav. 87, 88 (1953) (even more "irresponsible" than the parents' be-
lief in faith healing is the court's interference with that belief).
100. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 2135 et seq. (West 1974).
101. So called "drugless practitioners" were once licensed in California. See, e.g., ch.
354, § 10, [1913] Cal. Stats. 722, 728 (repealed ch. 233, § 3, [1949] Cal. Stat. 484.)
Today, persons holding themselves out as "drugless practitioners" or "naturopaths"
(drugless healers who use herbal medicinals) may not be licensed under existing law
and may not practice without a license. That is, in order to practice they must be li-
censed either as physicians and surgeons or as chiropractors. Naturopathy has been de-
fined as the use of "light, air, water, clay, heat, rest, diet, herbs, electricity, massage,"
etc. in curing. Oosterveen v. Board of Medical Examiners, 112 Cal. App. 2d 201, 205
n.1, 246 P.2d 136, 139 n.1 (1952).
102. Newhouse v. Board of Osteopathic Examiners, 159 Cal. App. 2d 728, 733, 324
P.2d 687, 691 (1958); People v. T. Wah Hing, 79 Cal. App. 286, 287-89, 249 P. 229,
233-35 (1926).
103. People v. Lucas, 198 N.Y.S. 846, 847-48 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
104. People v. Albrexstondare, 71 Cal. App. 339, 348-49, 235 P. 87, 90 (1925).
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cine."' 0 5  A person found to have been practicing medicine illegally
may be liable for homicide if the "patient" dies.'0 6
Diagnosis and treatment of disease without the proper license may
be either a misdemeanor 07 or a felony'05 in California. However, the
Code provides that "[nlothing in this chapter shall be construed so as
to. . . regulate, prohibit or apply to any kind of treatment by prayer,
nor interfere in any way with the practice of religion."'10 This provi-
sion is sometimes referred to as an "exemption" from the licensing stat-
ute;1 0 however, it is apparent from the language of the statute that it
was intended, not as an "exemption," but as a legislative expression
that healing by prayer is not to be construed as coming within the scope
of the definition of "medicine.""' Good faith belief in the treatment
is an essential element; the use of prayer may not be relied on as a
"mere subterfuge" to validate otherwise unlawful activities."12
The California licensing provision is typical of a modem statutory ap-
proach to regulation of the practice of medicine. "" It provides a clear
indication that the true "faith healer" is not to be considered as engag-
ing in medical practice. While there is some old case law in other juris-
dictions holding that faith healers fall within the scope of the statutes,":
4
this does not reflect the current legislative trend, which grants a broader
105. Ex parte Greenhall, 153 Cal. 767, 96 P. 804 (1908). See generally Rubenstein,
Criminal Aspects of Faith Healing, 224 N. ENG. J. MED. 293 (1941) (for a similar defi-
nition of "practicing medicine").
106. People v. Nunn, 65 Cal. App. 2d 188, 194-95, 150 P.2d 476, 480 (1944). A
licensed chiropractor, practicing surgery outside the scope of his license but under the
supposed direction of a licensed osteopath, was convicted of conspiracy to violate the
licensing statute and of manslaughter when two patients died.
107. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CoDE ANN. § 2141 (West 1974).
108. Id. § 2141.5. This provision, enacted in 1967, covers willful practice without
a license which endangers life or health. There are no reported cases construing section
2141.5, but it could be used in a variety of situations.
109. Id. § 2146.
110. People v. Jordan, 172 Cal. 391, 398, 156 P. 451, 454 (1916). See also Trescher
& O'Neill, supra note 12, at 216.
111. People v. Jordan, 172 Cal. 391, 400, 156 P. 451, 453 (1916); Ex parte Bohan-
non, 14 Cal. App. 321, 322, 111 P. 1039 (1910). The statute does have several
"exemptions," clearly labeled as such. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 2144 (West
1974) (emergency care); id. § 2145 (out-of-state practitioners as consultants); id.
§ 2145.1 (acupuncture or traditional Chinese medicine administered under supervision
of licensed physician); id. § 2147 (medical students).
112. People v. Cosper, 76 Cal. App. 597, 600, 245 P. 466, 468 (1926). See also Peo-
ple v. Hickey, 283 N.Y.S. 968, 970, 972-73 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1935) (defendant's "church"
had a membership of twelve, including himself and his family; whether the healing was
within the scope of religion was a question of fact for the jury).
113. See Annot., 93 A.LR.2d 129 (1964).
114. See, e.g., State v. Buswell, 58 N.W. 728 (Neb. 1894); State v. Marble, 73 N.E.
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scope to the exercise of religious beliefs.115
Some states take a middle ground, construing all purported "healing"
as coming within the statute, but granting an "exemption' for the Chris-
tian Science Church.116 The constitutionality of these statutes may be
subject to an equal protection attack as a similar exemption is not
granted to other religions.117  The statute may be additionally suspect
given the generally broad scope now granted the free exercise
clause,118 as well as the prohibition of the establishment clause.110
The "practice of medicine" is illegal when done or attempted by one
who is not legally licensed. 2 ° It is clear that the statutory prohibition
includes holding oneself out as a healing professional or the equivalent,
making a business of diagnosing and prescribing remedies.1 21  It is
1063 (Ohio 1905). Both Marble and Buswell involved Christian Science practitioners.
Neither case is the law in this respect in its jurisdiction today. See NEn. Rnv. STAT.
§ 71-1,102 (1971); Omo RaV. CODE ANN. § 4731, 4731.34 (Anderson 1954).
115. See text accompanying note 113 supra.
116. See State v. Marble, 73 N.E. 1063 (Ohio 1905). See also John, Recognition of
Christian Science Treatment, 1963 INs. L.J. 18 [hereinafter cited as John].
117. In Craig v. State, 155 A.2d 684 (Md. Ct. App. 1959), defendants, believers in
a faith healing sect, claimed that they were denied equal protection under the fourteenth
amendment by a statute which purported to "exempt" only Christian Scientists from the
medical practice laws. Id. at 691. The statute provides that:
Nothing in this subtitle [wherein practitioners of medicine and surgery are pro-
hibited from treating human ailments without a license] ... shall prevent any
Christian Science Practitioner duly registered in the Christian Science Journal ...
from treating human ills in accordance with the tenets of Christian Science or from
making an adequate charge for services performed.
Ch. 185, § 1, [1947] Md. Laws (as amended MID. CODE ANN. art. 43, § 136A (1957)).
The court concluded, however, that the defendants were "not prosecuted because they
prayed, but for their alleged negligent failure to provide medical care." 155 A.2d at
691. Christian Science is permitted, but is not made the "equivalent" of medical care.
Christian Science parents could also be prosecuted for failure to provide their children
with proper care. Id.
The court did not decide the constitutionality of singling out one religious sect for
special statutory recognition. In fact, constitutionality may not be an issue under this
particular statute. The wording suggests that it may be read to merely define a (non-
exclusive) class which is not to be included with medical practitioners, and is not a le-
gally operative "exemption."
118. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963).
119. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963).
120. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CoDE ANN. H9 2141, 2141.5 (West 1974); see Oosterveen
v. Board of Medical Examiners, 112 Cal. App. 2d 201, 246 P.2d 136 (1952); People
v. Nunn, 65 Cal. App. 2d 188, 150 P.2d 476 (1944); People v. T. Wah Hing, 79 Cal.
App. 286, 249 P. 229 (1926).
121. People v. Vermillion, 30 Cal. App. 417, 418, 158 P. 504, 504 (1916) (pharma-
cist recommending vitamins held "prescribing"). See also State v. Karsunky, 84 P.2d
390, 393 (Wash. 1938) (for a definition of "practicing medicine?').
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equally clear that a true "faith healer" who does not touch the patient,
prescribes no drugs or home remedies, and confines his activities
strictly to prayer is not included.'22 The line is not so easily drawn,
however, when a person not only claims to heal by "faith" but also per-
forms some functions normally attributed to medical personnel.
The California Supreme Court, in People v. Jordan,123 upheld the
then-equivalent of the present licensing statutes,1 24 including the provi-
sion placing treatment by prayer outside the scope of the licensing sec-
tions. The court held that the licensing law was intended to protect
the public from the "dangers and evil" of treatment by one without ade-
quate knowledge of his craft and that the exception for treatment by
prayer alone is a rational one, grounded in the fact that the effective-
ness of prayer is entirely independent of the knowledge of anatomy.
1 25
The court also stated that diagnosis is part of medical practice, not part
of prayer treatment.12 Thus, those attempting a medical diagnosis, as
was Jordan, are "practicing medicine" within the meaning of the stat-
ute. The court reasoned that those who go to a practitioner who heals
by prayer alone are actually relying on the power of God for a cure,
and not the knowledge and skills of the "healer" as such. 2 However,
those who hold themselves out as having special scientific knowledge,
outside the realm of ordinary experience, must be subject to some regu-
lation for the public's protection. 28
The necessity for such regulation is revealed by People v. Phillips,
2
122. People v. Jordan, 172 Cal. 391, 396-400, 156 P. 451, 453-54 (1916); CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE ANN. § 2146 (West 1974).
123. 172 Cal. 391, 156 P. 451 (1916).
124. Ch. 354, § 22, [1913] Cal. Stat. 722, 736 (codified as amended at CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE ANN. § 2146 (West 1974)).
125. 172 Cal. at 396, 156 P. at 453. The court stated:
The scripture abounds with instances which, if accepted, tend to show that prayer
in the treatment of disease was deemed efficacious and helpful .... To assume
that treatment by prayer is less efficacious or more dangerous or harmful to the
subject of the prayer by reason of the fact that the supplicant has failed to devote
260 hours to manipulative and mechanical therapy, or has neglected to study ele-
mentary bacteriology for a period of 60 hours, does violence to all legal or religious
teaching.
Id. at 398, 156 P. at 454.
126. Id. at 398-400, 156 P. at 454.
127. See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944); text accompanying note
1 supra.
128. 172 Cal. at 400, 1.56 P. at 454-55; see State v. Karsunky, 84 P.2d 390, 394
(Wash. 1938). When a person undertakes to treat a disease, he is "bound to know the
nature of the remedies" he prescribes. Thus, a person may be criminally negligent and
guilty of manslaughter if he prescribes a scientifically incorrect method of treatment, re-
gardless of whether or not he is licensed. Id. at 395; see Hampton v. State, 39 So. 421
(Fla. 1905).
129. 64 Cal. 2d 574, 414 P.2d 353, 51 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1966).
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a relatively recent California Supreme Court case dealing with a
"quack"' 30 who purported to be able to cure cancer without surgery.
The defendant was convicted of murder even though the victim (an
eight-year-old girl) was no longer under his "care" when she died.
Her parents subsequently sought to cure her with a Mexican herb and
had visited a Christian Science practitioner.1 31 Phillips had started the
chain of events which resulted in the girl's being removed from medical
care, and the supreme court, while reversing the conviction on other
grounds, 132 agreed with the lower court's conclusion that the jury could
properly have found that his conduct had been the proximate cause of
death, 33 adding that he would have been unable to defend against a
properly presented charge of involuntary manslaughter. 34
In People v. Vogelgesang,3 0 a leading case in this area of the law,
the defendant was convicted of illegal practice of medicine after his
"patient" died of heart disease, but homicide apparently was not
charged. 3 6 He defended on religious grounds, claiming that he was
a member of, and recognized healer in, a "spiritualist church," of which
"spiritual healing" was allegedly a tenet.13 7 Justice Cardozo, in de-
livering the opinion of the New York Court of Appeals, stated that
"[i]f that is all he has done, he has acted within his rights. We think
he has done more.'13 8  Here, "faith," combined with the prescription
130. The subject of "quackery" in general is beyond the scope of this Comment as
it usually involves intent to defraud. See Comment, Quackery in California, 11 STAN.
L. REV. 265 (1959).
131. There is no indication of any attempt to prosecute these healers, or to charge
the parents with neglect.
132. 64 Cal. 2d at 582, 414 P.2d at 360, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 231 (the jury had been
erroneously instructed on the "felony-murder rule").
133. Id. at 579, 414 P.2d at 358, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 230.
134. Id. at 585-86 n.10, 414 P.2d at 362 n.10, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 234 n.10. Phillips
was convicted under a felony-murder instruction, the felony being grand theft. The su-
preme court held this instruction should not have been given, since theft is not an "in-
herently dangerous" felony and since the instruction relieved the jury of the responsibil-
ity of finding one of the elements necessary to murder (i.e., malice). Id. at 584, 414
P.2d at 361, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 233.
Phillips was decided prior to the enactment in 1967 of section 2141.5 of the Business
and Professions Code (CAL. Bus. & PROF. CoDE ANN. § 2141.5 (West 1974)), which
makes the unlicensed practice of medicine a possible felony when done willfully and at
the risk of great bodily harm, illness, or death. This may well be an "inherently danger-
ous felony" within the meaning of the rule, making the violator subject to second-degree
murder charges.
135. 116 N.E. 977 (N.Y. 1917).
136. Id. at 978.
137. Id.
138. Id. The court no doubt took into account the fact that the patient's wife claimed
never to have heard "spiritualism" mentioned until after his death. Id. at 977.
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of patent medicines (patented by Vogelgesang himself), was held suf-
ficient to support the charge of illegal practice of medicine. 180 Justice
Cardozo pointed out that "[t]he law, in its protection of believers, has
other cures in mind"'140 and that Vogelgesang was attempting to com-
pete with physicians on their own ground, without sufficient training.141
The faith treatment must be strictly spiritual to qualify as legal.' 42
It thus appears that a self-styled "healer" who does any act within
the meaning of the term "practicing medicine" may be liable under the
statute and may be found guilty of homicide, most likely involuntary
manslaughter, if the patient dies.' 43  His motive is irrelevant. Sup-
pose, as in the case of the diabetic child, that the healer's recommenda-
tions and behavior are purely "spiritual," with the exception that he rec-
ommends the patient stop taking medication.' 44  The negative com-
mand could be judicially interpreted as a kind of prescription, because
the healer is directing a course of action which could lead to serious
results and because he holds himself out as having some expertise on
which the patient may rely.' 45  It is at this juncture that "intent" and
"good faith' may become crucial.
If the physical actions of the healer are unclear and he has not actu-
ally "prescribed" anything in the positive sense, he may be able to de-
fend unlawful practice of medicine or manslaughter charges on reli-
gious grounds. For example, if the tenets of his religion dictate that
no medicine whatsoever be put into the body and if he tells this to his
followers, the court may not inquire into the truth of these beliefs, al-
though the good faith in which the beliefs are held may be an issue. 40
It should be left to the followers to accept or reject the beliefs, subject
to the duty of parents to provide medical attention for minor children.
139. Id. at 978.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Hampton v. State, 39 So. 421, 424 (Fla. 1905); State v. Karsunky, 84 P.2d 390,
394-95 (Wash. 1938); see note 134 supra.
144. It was not clear from the newspaper reports whether any such recommendations
were made in the real-life case. Two cases, People v. Vogelgesang, 116 N.E. 977 (N.Y.
1917), and State v. Karsunky, 84 P.2d 390 (Wash. 1938), dealt with patients who died
of pre-existing disease not properly treated, but in both cases the "healer" replaced the
needed medication with nostrums of his own.
145. See People v. Jordan, 172 Cal. 391, 156 P. 451 (1916); People v. Vogelgesang,
116 N.E. 977 (N.Y. 1917). It is possible that a court would interpret this even more
strictly where the life of a young child is involved, since the child could not be expected
to have made a rational decision to rely on the "faith healer" as opposed to another
cure.
146. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944).
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This, in fact, seems to be the basis on which many lower court decisions
are reached-the parents may be liable for manslaughter and the faith
healer, whom they believed, is free from liability.
147
If and when a healer actually violates a licensing statute, motive may
be an issue. The healer might do something which a court could con-
strue as diagnosing or prescribing, such as recommending that the pa-
tient stop taking a prescribed medication. If he does this "willfully,
under circumstances or conditions which cause or create a risk of great
bodily harm, serious mental or physical illness, or death, ' 148 section
2141.5 of the California Business and Professions Code would apply,
making the act a felony. If the patient dies as a result of a faith-cure
attempted under these circumstances, the statute could lay the founda-
tion for a felony-murder charge.
A healer, even one who takes an active role, apparently has no legal
duty comparable to the physician's duty to warn of known risks. The
faith healer is not supposed to possess any particular degree of skill or
knowledge in diagnosis or treatment.
C. Other Criminal Liability
Other potential criminal liabilities would include assault, battery, and
homicide, if the "faith healer" has injured, or caused injury, to another,
regardless of the licensing requirement. May a "good faith" healer
who has "done" nothing, in the sense that he has committed no act in
violation of the medical practice statutes, still be criminally liable?
He probably could not be found guilty of any form of murder, since
he would not harbor the requisite malice.149  He could be convicted
of involuntary manslaughter only if it could be proved that his act was
one likely to cause death and that he acted without due caution. 5 0 To
demonstrate this it must first be shown that there was an "act," not
simply an omission to provide care. This is a most difficult burden for
147. See Commonwealth v. Breth, 44 Pa. County Ct. 56 (1915); Commonwealth v.
Hoffman, 29 Pa. County Ct. 65 (1903); cases discussed in note 48 supra.
148. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 2141.5 (West 1974).
149. CAL. PENAL CoDE §§ 187-88 (West 1972). But see State v. House, 489 P.2d
381 (Ore. 1971) (upholding first degree murder indictment against parents who were
alleged to have willfully and deliberately failed to provide cure for sick child (religion
not in issue)). The possible felony-murder instruction would not be applicable unless
a felony was committed. A true "quack" who fraudulently claimed to have extraordi-
nary healing powers might arguably be said to have malice (express or implied) without
necessity for the felony-murder instruction. But see People v. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d 574,
584, 414 P.2d 313, 361, 51 Cal. Rptr. 225, 233 (1966).
150. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West 1972).
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the prosecution to sustain even in cases of parents charged with neg-
lect under a specific statute. 5' One would expect it to be even more
difficult where the responsibility of the healer, if any, is not spelled out
by the law.
In State v. Sandford,152 the leader of a religious community was
charged with manslaughter in the death of a boy of the community.
The case does not focus on the extent of the leader's duty, but implies
that, because the whole community was under the "supervision, domin-
ion [and] control" of Sandford, he had the responsibility for its welfare
and should have used great care in dictating treatment.158 The Maine
Supreme Court reversed Sandford's conviction, however, on the ground
of an erroneous jury instruction which required the jury to decide
whether it believed in the efficacy of the prayer treatments. 5 4  The
indecisive result of Sandford, plus the absence of recent appellate court
decisions relating to the liabilities of the faith healer himself, seems to
reinforce the view that the risk of conviction is not great if the healer
acts in good faith and does not do anything amounting to the practice
of medicine. 155
Criminal conviction for assault requires an attempt coupled with
present ability to commit a "violent injury,"' 56 and battery requires the
151. Of particular interest is Craig v. State, 155 A.2d 684, 688-89 (Md. Ct. App.
1959), where the court held that failure to perform a legal duty, coupled with "gross
and wanton negligence," would be grounds for a manslaughter conviction; however, the
gross negligence must be the proximate cause of death. Thus, if parents fail to call in
a physician when the child is not apparently seriously ill, then negligence is "ordinary."
Later, when the child is obviously dying, then negligence becomes "gross and wanton."
At that point, however, it is too late to save the child, so failure to treat him is not
the. proximate cause of death. E.g., Bradley v. State, 84 So. 677 (Fla. 1920); State v.
Chenow'eth, 71 N.E. 197 (Ind. 1904); State v. Beach, 329 S.W.2d 712 (Mo. 1959); State
v. Watson, 71 A. 1113 (N.J. 1909). Bradley, Chenoweth, and Watson suggest, al-
though uniformly stating that religion is "no defense," that a conviction based on a find-
ing of sufficient negligence to override religious convictions would be almost impossible
to sustain on appeal. The courts' attitude toward parents may also extend to the heal-
ers-perhaps more so, since their duties, if any, are not as clear.
152. 59 A. 597 (Me. 1905).
153. Id. at 598. The report does not indicate whether the boy's parents were charged,
but does state that his mother also lived in the community. Id.
154. The jury had been instructed in such a way that, if they believed that prayer
would cure the sick and if they found that Sandford's prayers had been insufficient, he
could have been convicted. Id. at 600.
155. Cawley argues forcefully for the idea that the healer may be liable, either as an
accessory before the fact to involuntary manslaughter, or possibly as a principal, and
states that such is the law in Canada. Cawley, supra note 6, at 72-73; see Rex v.
Brooks, [1902] 9 B.C. 13. However, he has found no such case reaching the higher
courts in the United States.
156. CAx. PENAL CODE § 240 (West 1972). "Violent injury" within the meaning of
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use of "force or violence."'157 It seems quite unlikely, considering the
state's burden of proof in a criminal case, that such a conviction could
be sustained against a faith healer as the "touching" or "laying on of
hands" is consented to and rarely violent.' 58
Refusal to submit to necessary medical treatment has sometimes
been compared to suicide, 159 although the two are conceptually distinct.
First, suicide involves an act, or malfeasance, while the failure to sub-
mit oneself to treatment involves mere nonfeasance. 0  Second, the
suicide actually desires to die, whereas the person refusing treatment
on religious grounds has no overt wish to die, but feels bound to follow
a religious belief demanding a course of action that could be fatal. In
fact, he may believe that a "miracle" will prevent his death. Although
the motive and rationale may differ, the consequences remain the
same-the individual has made a choice which could result in his own
death.
If the individual, particularly the sane adult, is to have the right to
determine what is done with his own life, should he not have this right
in all circumstances? Despite the fact that suicide is not illegal in many
states,' 61 there seems to be no absolute "right," constitutional or other-
wise, to choose death.162  The courts may feel at times that injury to
society may result from such a choice and that society has an overriding
concern in preventing the death.'""
It has been suggested'0 that the real reason for society's condemna-
the statute is not synonymous with "bodily harm," but includes any wrongful act com-
mitted by physical force, even though no physical injury results. Ware v. Dunn, 80 Cal.
App. 2d 936, 942, 183 P.2d 128, 132 (1947); People v. James, 9 Cal. App. 2d 162, 163,
48 P.2d 1011, 1012 (1935). Physical force is an essential element.
157. CAL. PENAL CODE § 242 (West 1972). A battery is simply a consummated as-
sault. People v. Glover, 257 Cal. App. 2d 502, 506, 65 Cal. Rptr. 219, 221 (1967).
A criminal battery cannot occur without an assault. People v. McCaffrey, 118 Cal.
App. 2d 611, 618, 258 P.2d 557, 562 (1953). Again, physical force is essential.
158. The major health danger in the faith cure is the lack of medication and care
which a doctor might provide, which is not within the ambit of these statutes. Tort
liability for assault and battery would appear even less likely. See generally Unauthor-
ized Rendition, supra note 24.
159. See John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 279 A.2d 670 (N.J. 1971);
Cawley, supra note 6, at 68-70; Unauthorized Rendition, supra note 24, at 869-75.
160. See notes 142-45 supra.
161. See Cawley, supra note 6, at 68.
162. Comment, The Right to Die, 9 UTAH L. Pmv. 161 (1964); Unauthorized Rendi-
tion, supra note 24.
163. Note, The Dying Patient: A Qualified Right to Refuse Medical Treatment, 7
J. FAMILY L. 644 (1968).
164. Unauthorized Rendition, supra note 24, at 870.
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tion of the voluntary acceptance of death is not the act itself, but its
motivation, which is highly antisocial. 165 Whatever the motives of the
"victim," society may seek to reinforce its values by forbidding acts
which seem destructive of "public health" and "general welfare," par-
ticularly where injury to more than one person could result.160
Although suicide is not illegal in California, 167 deliberately aiding
and abetting a person in committing suicide is a felony.'66 Since some
courts do consider refusal of specified medical treatment as analogous
to suicide,6 9 the faith healer could be charged under this statute. Such
a charge, however, would have all the proof problems of a homicide
charge,1 70 with the additional difficulty that the prosecution would have
to show that the death was really suicide and that the healer acted de-
liberately.
D. The Use of Drugs or Devices in Healing
Some religious sects dictate the use of drugs or devices which are
regulated by law.17 ' While not "faith healing" in the strict sense
used here,17  attempted diagnosis and cure in accordance with these
religious beliefs' 73 presents problems similar to those of faith healers.
165. "Suicide shows contempt for society. It is rude. . . ." H. FEEDEN, SUICIDE 42
(1938), quoted in Unauthorized Rendition, supra note 24, at 870. The theory that soci-
ety sees its highest values rejected by those who choose death could apply equally well,
from society's standpoint, where medical treatment is refused. However, the rationale
of the "victim" is quite different. The suicide in fact rejects what society has to offer,
whereas one who dies when a faith cure fails is making a good faith effort to be cured.
166. One commentator suggests that the desire of society to preserve an individual's
life is connected to the idea of each person's "social worth," hence all persons should
be treated equally. Unauthorized Rendition, supra note 24, at 872. In fact, when a
court orders medical treatment against a patient's will, as in the blood transfusion cases,
it balances a number of factors, of which "social worth" does not seem to be included.
Factors recognized by the courts include dependents who may directly suffer from the
patient's death, the fact that part of the treatment was voluntary, the necessity of the
procedure being ordered, the patient's apparent attitude and rationality, and the court's
estimation of the importance of preserving life. United States v. George, 239 F. Supp.
752, 753 (D. Conn. 1965).
167. Tate v. Canonica, 180 Cal. App. 898, 903, 5 Cal. Rptr. 28, 33 (1960) (dictum).
168. CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West 1972).
169. S'ee, e.g., John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 279 A.2d 670 (N.J.
1971) (a Jehovah's Witness/blood transfusion case). A more difficult problem would
be posed if the dying person did not believe in the morality of medical treatment at all,
but such a case rarely, if ever, comes to the attention of authorities until after the fact.
170. See notes 149-51 supra and accompanying text.
171. E.g., The "Pure Food and Drug" laws, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1970). Califor-
nia laws, similar to the federal, are found at CAL. HEALTH & SAFTY CODE ANN. § 26200
et seq. (West 1974).
172. See notes 6-9 supra and accompanying text.
173. The Scientology Church sometimes makes use of electronic devices for "diagnos-
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In addition, some "quacks" use electronic devices to give the appear-
ance of scientific validity to their "diagnoses."'1 7
4 '
In general, devices which are alleged to have diagnostic value may
be regulated, even though used in accordance with a religion.
175
Where there is no scientific basis for belief in the purported diagnostic
or healing power of the device, it must display a warning to that ef-
fect.170  This policy could possibly be expanded to require faith healers
to warn followers of the possible health dangers and risks of criminal
liability that may stem from failure to seek medical attention. Since
there is a duty on the part of the user of such a device, the duty could
be expanded to require the faith healer to warn of the lack of a scien-
tific basis for his art.177  It may be difficult to construct such a duty,
however, because the healer is unlikely to take credit for the results,
preferring to be considered a mere conduit for God.' 78
Ordinarily, the use of legally restricted drugs for non-medical pur-
poses is not permitted, even under the claim that their use is mandated
by religionY.9  However, in recent years a major exception to this rule
has been made for the ceremonial use of peyote,18 0 particularly by
tic!' purposes and has been regulated. Church of Scientology v. Richardson, 437 F.2d
214 (9th Cir. 1971); Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146
(D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v. Article or Device . . . "Hubbard Electrometer,"
333 F. Supp. 357 (D.D.C. 1971).
174. See, e.g., Drown v. United States, 198 F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 920 (1953); People v. Handzik, 102 N.E.2d 340 (Ill. 1951).
175. United States v. Article or Device . . . "Hubbard Electrometer," 333 F. Supp.
357, 362 (D.D.C. 1971); see 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (1970).
176. United States v. Article or Device . . . "Hubbard Electrometer," 333 F. Supp.
357, 362 (D.D.C. 1971). This may not disturb a believer who does not require a scien-
tific basis for religious belief. Science, in fact, might detract from the mystical quilities
associated with the unexplained.
177. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
178. See, e.g., K. KUHLMAN, GOD CAN Do IT AGAiN 9 (1969).
179. Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851, 860 (5th Cir. 1967), rev'd on other
grounds, 392 U.S. 903 (1968); State v. Big Sheep, 243 P. 1067, 1073 (Mont. 1926);
State v. Bullard, 148 S.E.2d 565, 568-69 (N.C. 1966). The reported cases do not deal
with the issue of the sincerity of the individual's belief. That is a question of fact,
which may dispose of many drug cases conclusively at the trial level. See Drug Reli-
gions, supra note 19. Inquiry into the truth of the belief violates the first amendment.
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944); Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851,
861 (5th Cir. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 392 U.S. 903 (1968).
180. State v. Whittingham, 504 P.2d 950, 952 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973); People v.
Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 720-22, 394 P.2d 813, 816-18, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 72-74 (1964);
In re Grady, 61 Cal. 2d 887, 888, 394 P.2d 728, 729, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912, 913 (1964). The
states of Iowa and New Mexico, by statute, exempt sacramental use of peyote from their
drug abuse laws. IowA CODE § 204A.2(12) (1969) (applying only to the Native'Amer-
ican Church); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 54-5-16 (1953) (any bona fide religious organiza-
tion).
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members of the well-established Native American Church.'8  The cri,
teria used by the courts in a balancinlg test to determine the permissibility
of the..drug use include whether the Se of the stbstalle 18 ¢cntraI to
the ppgctie of the reigiqo s  ind whether th gubstmace is l lwd in a
M.n.nr pot _li.grous to publiq health, Sf*ty 4nd ! 41s.lsP,' This
reasoong is lkey to be followed a-nd c'ried ovcr tQ other free dom
of religion pa.es. as well.
IV'. TE BELIEVERS' D EFNsE, PuBljrI ACCgpTANCE
AND RELIQIQVS FR"DQO4
The issue of "faith healing" occasionally comes up in other contexts,
when life or death is not immediately at issue. Examples include fil-
ing an insurance claim,8 4 or exemption from some government regula-
tion, such as vaccination,""; school classes in health education,5 0 or
other public health activity.1 7 A brief examination of these cases
Interestingly, the Indian nations themselves may prohibit the ritual use of drgs, aqd
freedom of rpligion may not be allowed as g Oqfgnse. Pur yee ?5 U.,C, 1302 (197Q)
("[n]o Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall . .. make or enforce
any law prohibiting the free exercise of relipon"). The first amendrent, as made ap-
plicable to the states through the fotirteenth amendment, does nqt Apply on the Indian
reservations, Whose tribal authority is said to be "highe-" than tllat of the states. See
Native American Church of North America v. Navajq Tribal Copn~cil, 272 F,2d I31
(10th Cir. 1959).
181. See note 200 infra. A "meet'g" of the Native American Chrph lasts fr m sun-
set to sunrise and is characterized by prayer, singing, aad ritual music. Thq cpqtral
event is the use and ingestion of the peyote plant, whipb i gonsidored a [iyine pibstance.
"A bona fide ceremony cgnnot take place without the presence of ppyQte." State v.
Whittingham, 504 P.2d 950, 951 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973).
Two recent cases upholding the ritual use of peyote, state Y. Whittingham, 504 P.2d
950 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973), and People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.20l 813, 40
Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964), discuss at length the conflict between the state's interest in pre-
serving its citizens' health, safety and welfare, and the citizens' rightp tQ? the free exereise
of religion. Both cases rejected the state's claim that peyote use should be prohibited
as hazardous to the user's health. 504 P.2d At 952-53; 61 Cal. 2d at 722, 394 p.2d at
818, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74. They also rejectqd the rgumept that thp §tqte'p interest in the
health and safety of its citizens and its interest in law enforcement arq so "compelling"
as to override the defendants' freedom to practice a central tenet pf their religion. 504
P.2d at 953-54; 61 Cal. 2d at 727, 394 P.2d qt 821, 40 Cal. Rptr. At 77.
182. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 72Z, 394 P.?A. 813, 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 74
(1964).
183. State v, Whittingham, 504 P.2d 950, 952 (Ariz, Ct. App. 1973); see Annot., 35
A.L.R.3d 939 (1970).
184. E.g., Christiansen v. Hollings, 44 Cal, App. 2d 332, 112 P.2,d 723 (1941);
Lange v. Hoyt, 159 A. 575 (Conn. 1932).
185. See note 13 supra.
186. See Schneider, supra note 7, at 86-87.
187. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (re-
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serves to shed some light on the attitudes of the courts toward faith
healing geerally--attitudes that today, are divided.
O el StUdy' s8 distugs r nttnbr of these exemptions, some ex-
ptessly for Chtistian Scie"itists in Pennsylvania, suggesting that such eX-
eitptidns reptesent growing public acceptance of faith healing be-
lidfs.189  Idl uddd are statUtoty dxemptions from required medical and
dental fxta1tiatiotrs fok Adhool Ohildcth, 9° exemption from the medical
examination requirement for marriage licenses,' 91 recognition of Chris-
tian Science by ilisurance companies,92 and deductibility of Christian
Science cate from federal income t;, 03
IAtirduo fed6vety rhay iott be allowed Where the patient relied on
faith halig tW the eluioh of hidtical treatniit, if medical treatment
ig t conditiola Of coverage, fttd it is sho~ii the treatment would have
been necessary and beneficial under the circumstances. 94 Insurance
paynidts may, h6wever, be allowed, particularly Where negligence is
not proven, and reimbursement for Christian Science practitioners,
nurses and sanitariums may be allowed. 95 Some Christian Scientists
haVe tecovered on personal injury claims, 19 but in these cases the pa-
tients ag~o received son1 medical attention and contributory negligence
was not shown.19
A significant proportion of these insurance exemptions, tort recov-
ligious exemption from flag salute); Hardwick v. Board of School Trustees, 54 Cal. App.
696, 205 P. 49 (1921) (religious exemption from dancing class). Although not
involving faith healing, these cases are indicative of a policy of noninterference with re-
ligious beliefs.
188. Trescher & O'Neill, supra note 12.
189. Id. at 212-17.
190. Id. at 215; see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 1419 (1962). The exemption does not
apply in cases where abstinence would constitute a "menace" to other persons. Califor-
nia has no such requirements. See note 15 supra.
191. Trescher & O'Neill, supra note 12, at 216.
192. Id.
193, Id, The pay scale of Christian Science practitioners is apparently similar to that
of medical doctors treating the same illness. See Schneider, supra note 7, at 81-82. The
constitutionality of such provisions may be in doubt where the Christian Science religion
alone qualifies for such an exemption. See John, supra note 116.
194. Rubenstein) Claim Cases by Christian Scientists, MEDiCAL TRIAL TEcHmQuE Q.
31, 33 (1963), citing Taylor vi Westland Distribution Co., 12 Cal. Ind. Acc. Comm'n
Dec. 118 (1925), and Ash v. Barker, 2 Cal. Ind. Acc. Comm'n Dec. 40 (1915). Note
that these are both relatively old cases; a modem court might be more lenient.
195. John, supra note 1161 at 20-21. Many insurance companies apparently recognize
Christian Science treatment. id. at 21.
196. Christiansen v. Hollings, 44 Cal. App. 2d 332, 112 P.2d 723 (1941); Lange v.
Hoyt, 159 A. 575 (Conn. 1932); Adams v. Carlo, 101 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. Ct. App. 1937).
197. See cases cited in note 196 supra.
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eries, and statutory exemptions from other requirements'9 8 deal specif-
ically with Christian Science, a long-established faith practiced by a
"large number of reasonable and intelligent people."' 0 9  Such exemp-
tions, when coupled with the peyote precedent of the relatively large
and well-known Native American Church,0 0 seem to indicate that there
is strength in numbers. The government might not necessarily grant
the small-time faith healer, or believer in some little-known sect, the
same sort of recognition.
California law shows a consistent pattern of legislative recognition of
healing by spiritual means. In addition to the provision of the Business
and Professions Code,201 all California code provisions which provide
for medical examinations or treatment have specific provisions exempt-
ing those who believe in healing by prayer.202 Although some of these
198. See Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 4371.09 et seq. (Anderson 1954) (discussed in note
114 supra).
199. Christiansen v. Hollings, 44 Cal. App. 2d 332, 346, 112 P.2d 723, 730 (1941).
Christian Science, "discovered" in 1866 by Mrs. Mary Baker Eddy, is now known and
practiced throughout the world. The Church publishes "testimonies" of those who be-
lieve they have been healed by the Church's methods; some forty-five thousand were on
file in 1966. CmusTmN ScIENcE PUBLISHmN Co., A CENTuRY OF CIUSTIAN SCIENCE
HEALING iX (1966). Christian Science, like other forms of faith healing, does not re-
,quire that a "cure" be manifested by spontaneous relief of the physical symptoms. Id.
at 239. The Church maintains two sanitariums of its own and certifies other private
institutions to care for the sick without medication. It also accredits Christian Science
nurses, who must complete a three-year training course. Id. at 242. The official text
setting forth Christian Science health beliefs is M.B. EDDY, SCIENCE AND HEALTH wrrT
KEY TO THE ScRnipvuns (1875).
200. State v. Whittingham, 504 P.2d 950 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973); People v. Woody,
61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964). According to the court in
Woody, estimates of membership in the Native American Church in 1964 ranged from
30,000 to 250,000, depending on the definition of membership. 61 Cal. 2d at 720, 394
P.2d at 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 73. The membership is probably greater today. The Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court, in In re Grady, 61 Cal. 2d 887, 888, 394 P.2d 728, 729, 39 Cal.
Rptr. 912, 913 (1964), made clear that the California exemption will apply to all bona
fide ritual use of peyote, regardless of specific church membership.
201. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 2146 (West 1974); see note 12 supra and ac-
companying text.
202. See note 13 supra and accompanying text. Business and Professions Code sec-
tion 2863 makes it clear that treatment by prayer shall not be construed as practicing
nursing without a license, and section 2884 exempts faith healing religions from the re-
quirement of accreditation for nursing schools. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 2863,
2884 (West 1974). Many other exemptions exist. E.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 11708
(West 1969) (mandatory tuberculosis examinations for school district employees); id.
§ 11825 (visual accuity examination for school children); CAL. Gov'T CODE ANN. §
19261 (West 1963) (standards of health and safety for state employees); CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE ANN. § 1709 (West 1974) (regulation of cancer treatment); id. § 3199
(required treatment of venereal disease); Id. § 3286 (tuberculosis regulation); id.
§ 3384 (polio vaccine); id. § 3404 (measles -vaccine); CAL. INS. CODB ANN. § 2709
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provisions refer specifically to members of a "well-recognized" -religious
sect 2 03 the proper test should be the good faith of the belief, not the
popularity of the creed.204  In keeping with the constitutional guaran-
tees of freedom of religion, equal tolerance must be accorded all sects
to practice their beliefs.
V. CONCLUSION
The belief in faith healing is not an isolated segment of the life of
the believer, but is part of his total religious orientation and "life-style,"
although it may not necessarily exclude the use of modem medicine.205
This belief, and the life-style that goes with it, certainly comes within
the scope of the Supreme Court's definition, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,
206
of a religious interest worthy of protection under the first amend-
ment.207  There are instances, however, when this freedom must come
directly into conflict with what has been, and no doubt will continue
to be, considered a "compelling state interest," that of the health and
safety of its citizens.
The older decisions, Reynolds v. United States28 for example, de-
fined the state's ability to regulate actions fairly broadly. Recent deci-
sions, however, have begun to curtail the state's power to restrict reli-
giously motivated actions.20
9
The right of an adult to believe as he wishes and to act on those
beliefs, so long as others are not endangered, should be protected by
the first amendment. Some cases stop short of allowing an individual
(West 1972) (medical examination for claiming disability benefits); CAL. WELF. &
INST'NS CODE ANN. § 5006 (West 1972) (Lanterman-Petris-Short Act providing for civil
commitment and treatment for mental illness); id. § 6300.1 (mentally disordered sex of-
fender commitment); id. § 7104 (county psychiatric hospital treatment); id. § 12006 (no
questions about religion may be asked in determining old age benefits); id. § 13506 (aid
to needy disabled); id. § 14059 (Medical); id. § 16508 (Child Protective Services Act).
203. CAL. EDUC. CODE ANN. H8 11708, 11825 (West 1969); CAL. HEALTH & SFETY
CODE ANN. §§ 3199, 3286 (West 1974); CAL. WELF. & INsT'Ns CODE ANN. §§ 6300.1,
7104, 16508 (West 1972).
204. Cf. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
205. Pattison, supra note 4, at 397 (study based on American "fundamentalist and
pentecostal" sects in California).
206. 406 U.S. 205, 217 (1972).
207. Id. at 222.
208. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
209. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964). Jus-
tice Douglas, in his partially dissenting opinion in Yoder, predicts that Reynolds will
be overruled on this point. 406 U.S. at 247.
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to choose death, for any reason.210 Indeed, many cases which define
the scope of religious freedom state that the freedom would not per-
mit human sactificp or titual suicide,2 11 It is certainly arguable that
a person should be free to die for his religious beliefs. Other cultures,
including the predecessors of our own, would have some difficulty in
comprehending the rationale which prevents it.2 1 2 However, when a
third person, particularly a child, is involved, the problem becomes
quite different. Then the courts should be, and are, quite cautious.
The faith healeri so long as he confines his activities strictly to prayer,
is not regulated. The "faith" is, and should be, unrestricted. The
"healing,"' however, may be regulated as soon as it takes on any appear-
ance of medical practice.
If a "healer" is involved, he is generally not subject to criminal liabil-
ity, as long as he has not violated the medical practice laws. These
laws were not intended to regulate religious beliefs, but to protect the
public from the harm that can result from an uninformed choice of
medical practitioners. Any counsel or advice in the guise of medical
practice is strictly regulated and may now be prosecuted as a felony
in California.
Cases such as the hypothetical presented, when they come to public
attention, are matters of grave concern. Such a case is likely to be the
subject of divided public opinion. On the one hand, the parents may
be thought of as eruel or insensitive for allowing an innocent child to
die, when the death is seen, by the majority of society, as wholly pre-
veotable. On the other hand, the parents themselves, out of genuine
devotion to their child and their faith, acted in what they believed to
be thb child's best interest. The law draws the line short of allowing
an innocent person to die (although the child's wishes are not generally
taken into account, a he is not considered "responsible" 213). If the
child is dying, he may be treated without parental consent. The par-
ents may be prosecuted for failure to provide medical care for the child,
whether or not he dies.
The general judicial approach reflects conflict between the right to
life and the freedom of religion guaranteed to all Americans by the
Constitution. Although religion is not an excuse for violation of the
210. See cases cited in note 78 supra,.
211. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1879).
212. See note 2 Mpra.
213. Pti 6f. Viscongin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in
part).
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law, the cases indicate a policy of judicial leniency where bona fide re-
ligious belief is the motive for an illegal act. 14
There is a danger of allowing the emotional impact of the "faith heal-
ing" cases to obscure the issues, or to permit encroachment on consti-
tutional rights. Perhaps the present policy of leniency is best. As one
commentator has written:
Those of us who belong to churches which are rich and reopwtable
quite properly condemn the snake handlq,, 4e floggers, fti faith
healers. But under a constitutional scge.m wNveh alow4 t st¢ p
religious favoritism, even these extremist groups must be as free to
follow their conscience as the rest of us are.
2 15
Whatever choices are made, however, both the policy and the letter
of the law should be clear and clearly stated, so that those who believe
in healing by prayer rather than medical treatment are aware of the
potential liabilities they may incur.
Catherine W. Laughran
214. There are some exceptions, e.g., the snake handling cases (see note 85 supra),
where the law was clearly intended to attack a particular religious sect which not only
was unpopular, but also was felt to be a genuine threat to public safety.
215. Wright, Book Review, 38 MnqN. L. Rv. 87, 89-90 (1953).
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